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Abstract—Malicious attacks in the power system can eventually
result in a large-scale cascade failure if not attended on time.
These attacks, which are traditionally classified into physical
and cyber attacks, can be avoided by using the latest and
advanced detection mechanisms. However, a new threat called
cyber-physical attacks which jointly target both the physical and
cyber layers of the system to interfere the operations of the power
grid is more malicious as compared with the traditional attacks.
In this paper, we propose a new cyber-physical attack strategy
where the transmission line is first physically disconnected, and
then the line-outage event is masked, such that the control center
is misled into detecting as an obvious line outage at a different
position in the local area of the power system. Therefore, the
topology information in the control center is interfered by our
attack. We also propose a novel procedure for selecting vulnerable
lines, and analyze the observability of our proposed framework.
Our proposed method can effectively and continuously deceive
the control center into detecting fake line-outage positions, and
thereby increase the chance of cascade failure because the
attention is given to the fake outage. The simulation results
validate the efficiency of our proposed attack strategy.
Index terms– Cyber-physical system, joint attacks, smart
grid, power line outages, power flow.
NOMENCLATURE
A. Sets and Indices
j, k Bus index.
l Line index.
nb Total bus number in the system.
nbr Total line number in the system.
i Represent
√−1.
G Graph representing the topology of the system.
N Sets of the buses in the system.
E Sets of the lines in the system.
L Sets of the buses connected to real line outage
position.
M Sets of the buses connected to fake line outage
position.
B Set of boundary buses in the attack region.
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A Set of buses except boundary buses in the attack
region.
φ Empty set.
B. Variables
z(z¯) Measurement vector before (after) attack.
Sl Complex power flow on line l. Equal to Pl + iQl.
Sl Modified complex power flow on line l. Equal to
P l + iQl.
lo Real outage line.
lm Fake outage line.
vj Complex voltage of bus j.
Vj Voltage magnitude of bus j.
Wj Squared voltage magnitude of bus j.
Cl Squared current magnitude of line l.
θj Voltage phase of bus j.
PDj (P
D
j )Real load of bus j before (after) attack.
Q
D
j Reactive load of bus j after attack.
C. Parameters
Pe Parameter error vector of the system.
R Measurement error covariance matrix.
Yl Admittance of line l. Equal to Gl + iBl.
Zl Impedance of line l.
L Line outage distribution factors matrix.
fl Influence factor of line l.
Pmaxl The thermal limit of line l.
Vmax Maximum voltage magnitude.
Vmin Minimum voltage magnitude.
D. Operators
|A| Cardinality of set A.
a · b Element-wise multiplication of vector a and b.
<(a) Real part of complex value a.
Other notations are defined in the text.
I. INTRODUCTION
APower system plays an important role in supporting mod-ern lives and economy. Upon a late detection, the initial
failures in a power system, may lead to a large-scale cascade
failure, and adversely affect the economy and security of a
nation [1]. Malicious attacks on a power system can lead to an
initially undetectable failure and eventually result in failure if
not attended in time. These attacks can be classified into cyber
and physical attacks. For physical attacks, [2], [3] proposed a
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2target selection methods that allow the terrorists to physically
attack the power system components (e.g., transmission lines,
generators, and transformers), cause a direct power system
outage, and triggers cascading failures, e.g. [4] explored the
attacks on the transmission substations in California in 2014.
However, with the aid of recent technological advancements,
power system operators are able to detect these attacks easily
and prevent a system failure.
Given that physical attacks are easily observable, attackers
have resorted to cyber attacks where they inject carefully pre-
designed data to the measurements sent by Supervisory Con-
trol and Data Acquisition (SCADA), thereby forcing power
system operators into making wrong dispatches. Although
various data processing modules, such as state estimation (SE)
and bad data detection, have been built to prevent system
operation failures and malicious attacks, these mechanisms can
be corrupted by carefully designed cyber attacks. Accordingly,
this topic has attracted much research attention over the past
few years [5]–[21].
The authors in [5] proposed classic false data injection (FDI)
attacks that cannot be detected by bad data detection tech-
niques and where the attacker can change the measurements
of sensors and capture sufficient information about the power
system. These designed attacks must obey the physical laws,
such as Kirchhoff’s Current Law, and Kirchhoff’s Voltage
Law. The authors in [6] and [7] studied classic FDI attacks
with incomplete information about the system, and [6], [7]
revealed that cyber attacks can bypass SE and bad data
detection techniques even if limited network information is
available. Furthermore, the authors attempted to construct the
cyber attack by using principal component analysis without
prior information as those in [8]. Then, recent development of
FDI attacks was summarized in [9].
By targeting both the cyber and physical levels of a power
system, the recently emerged cyber-physical attacks can inter-
fere with the operations of the system more efficiently than
the classic FDI attacks with only pure cyber attacks. Cyber-
physical attacks can still be classified into line-removing and
line-maintaining attacks as described in [10].
In a line-maintaining attack, the attacker physically dis-
connects the transmission line and simultaneously masks this
outage event with altered sensor measurements. Other forms of
advanced line-maintaining attacks have been studied in [11]–
[18]. Specifically, the authors in [11], [12] masked the outage
event with a local redistribution attack that was extended to
a local attack with incomplete topology information. A line-
maintaining attack was recently launched at the Ukrainian
electrical grid in 2015 [13], where the physical components
of the system were disconnected and the SCADA system was
illegally attacked by a third party. Such attack left 225, 000
customers without power. The attack was designed based on
finding out the line that can cause the most damaging to the
system in [14]. Then, the authors in [15], [16] attempted to
modify the PMU data to mask the outage event. The attack
model was further derived using the power flow method [17]
and SE [18].
Meanwhile in a line-removing attack, also called topology
attacks, the attacker generates a fake outage event to disturb
the regular system operation. This attack must avoid the trivial
solution in order not to be detected by the control center.
Using this approach, the attacker can efficiently mislead the
control center with an incorrect network topology and then
lead the system to an unstable situation by sending the wrong
dispatches. Line-removing attacks have been studied with both
partial and whole information of the system and have been
mitigated using countermeasure [19], [20]. The authors in [21]
focused on a line-removing attack in a local area and proposed
a method for locating the attack region.
Based on the discussions above, the previous approaches
have obtained the promising results and demonstrated the
potential of the cyber-physical attacks. However, most of
these approaches were based on DC model, which is different
from the real-world system; also, false data constructed by
DC model may cause large residual in AC state estimation
[22]. Only few studies, such as [17], [18], [23], proposed
the construction of the attack in AC system. However, in
[17], [18], they still constructed the attack with DC model
first and then transformed to AC system. Then, in [23], it
focused more on vulnerability assessment of AC state esti-
mation under cyber-attack. Moreover, there existed no study
that combined line-maintaining and line-removing attacks to
create more malicious attack to the power system. Also, when
implementing the cyber-physical attacks, one must notice that
not all transmission lines in the power system can be selected
as attack targets because some lines are strictly protected by
the control center. Only few studies, such as [10], considered
the rules of selection.
Motivated by the above observations, we develop a novel
attack strategy that combines the line-removing and line-
maintaining attack strategies in the AC system. The attack
is implemented in the local area and cannot be easily detected
because our design ensures that the physical laws of the power
system are satisfied. Unlike previous studies, we propose a rule
for selecting target lines instead of randomly selecting such
lines. We also use the traditional SE method that combines
normalized Lagrange multipliers and measurement residuals
[24]–[26] to test the effectiveness of our proposed attack
strategy. The contributions of this study are summarized as
follows:
• We propose a novel attack strategy with AC model,
which aims to physically attack the transmission line and
simultaneously mask the real outage event with the cyber
attack by misleading the control center into checking
another fake outage line. With this approach, the control
center cannot obtain the accurate information about the
topology. Therefore, the control center needs to develop
another method of detecting the system topology.
• Instead of randomly selecting target lines, we design a
target line selection rule based on line outage distribution
factor (LODF). According to the simulation, the proposed
target line selection results in higher success rate and
no false alarm, which is better than random target line
selection. This method can also help control center to
identify the locations vulnerable to attacks as in [27],
[28].
• We apply the conventional SE and bad data detection
3techniques to test the effectiveness of the proposed attack.
The simulation results reveal that the control center
detects the fake outage position and that the real outage
event is successfully hidden. This highlights the need of
developing another effective detection mechanism.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, the system considered in this study is
divided into two parts, namely the SE and the cyber-physical
attack model. We briefly illustrate the SE based on the AC
power flow model and the basic calculation of the power
system in this section. Then, our proposed attack strategy is
introduced in the next section. The attack strategy must follow
the physical laws introduced in this section.
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Fig. 1. The system block diagram.
A. Power Flow Model
We consider a power transmission network with nb buses
and nbr lines, and let N and E denote the sets of buses and
lines, respectively. The power network can then be represented
as a graph denoted as G = {N , E}. Assuming a line l ∈ E
that connects buses j and k, the apparent power of the line
flowing from buses j to k denoted as Sl can be represented
as follows:
Sl = Y
∗
l |vj |2 − Y ∗l vjv∗k, (1)
where Yl is the admittance of line l, and vj and vk are the
voltages of buses j and k respectively. The voltage of bus j
can be represented in polar form as follows:
vj = Vje
iθj , (2)
where Vj is the voltage magnitude, θj is the corresponding
phase, and i represents
√−1. The vector of all power flows
is s = [S1 · · ·Snbr ] ∈ Cnbr×1, and the voltage of the buses is
denoted as v = [v1 · · · vnb ] ∈ Cnb×1. The apparent power of
line l, can be divided into real and reactive power, Pl and Ql,
which are
Pl = |Vj |2Gl− VjVk (Gl cos(θj− θk)+Bl sin(θj− θk)) , (3)
Ql =−|Vj |2Bl−VjVk (Gl sin(θj−θk)−Bl cos(θj− θk)) , (4)
where Gl + iBl = Yl, and Sl = Pl + iQl.
B. State Estimation
Based on the power flow model, we then introduce the
state estimator as shown in Fig. 1. The system states are
represented by the voltage of the bus, v. Therefore, the
measurements received by the SCADA system without attacks
can be expressed as follows:
z = h(Pe,G,v) + n, (5)
where z usually comprises the measurements of bus injection
power and line power flow, and h(·) is the nonlinear function
relating to the measurements that depend on the network
topology G, network parameter error vector Pe ∈ Cnbr×1
representing the parameter errors, and system state vector v.
The measurement errors are denoted as n. We further denote
the measurements modified by the attacker as z.
After obtaining the measurement expression, we adopt the
weighted least-squares SE to estimate the system state v. The
SE problem aims to minimize the sum of squares of the
weighted deviations of the measurements estimated from z.
The SE problem is then solved by the following optimization
problem where zero parameter errors are assumed:
F1 : min
v̂,Pe
(z− h (Pe,G, v̂))TR−1(z− h (Pe,G, v̂)) (6a)
s.t. Pe = 0, (6b)
where v̂ is the estimated system state vector, Pe is the param-
eter error vector, and R is the measurement error covariance
matrix.
C. Bad Data and Parameter Error Detection
After applying SE, we must bypass bad data and parameter
error detection to ensure that the measurements are free from
bad data or parameter errors. Accordingly, we apply the
normalized residual and Lagrange multiplier method for the
detection.
The measurement residual vector can be expressed as:
r = z− h(Pe,G,v). (7)
If the Lagrange multiplier method is applied in (6), then λ
denotes the Lagrange multiplier related to the parameter error.
Given r and λ, the normalized residual, rN , and normalized
Lagrange multipliers, λN , can be calculated. The normalized
residuals are linked to the corresponding measurements, and
the normalized Lagrange multipliers are related to the pa-
rameter. Further details about this procedure can be found in
[24]–[26]. With rN and λN , the errors follow the Gaussian
distributions, and we choose the largest value between these
two parameters of the corresponding line. If the chosen value
is below the identification threshold, then the measurements
are free from bad data or parameter errors. By contrast, the
measurement or parameter corresponding to the chosen largest
value will be identified as the error. The part corresponding
to this error will be eliminated, and the detection mechanism
is reapplied. Such procedure is performed recursively until no
errors are detected.
4III. PROPOSED CYBER PHYSICAL ATTACK MODEL
In this section, the attacker block in Fig. 1 is illustrated. We
first explain the capabilities of the attackers and the limitations
of selecting the target lines, and then introduce the components
for launching the attacks separately, namely, selection of target
lines, identification of the cyber attack region, and alteration
of measurements. Here, the target lines include the real and
the fake outage lines.
A. Introduction of the Attack
We assume that the attackers have the following capabilities:
1) the attacker has knowledge about the topology G of the
entire system;
2) the attacker has the capability to observe the sub-
network of G and perform the power flow calculation
for the sub-network; and
3) the attacker only has the capability to change the states
of the measurements in the sub-network rather than
whole network.
To launch an attack, the attackers are limited to finite sets of
target lines because of the following reasons:
1) the line that connects to a “three-winding transformer”,
or in between two generators cannot be physically
attacked;
2) the real and fake outage events cannot take place next
to each other; otherwise, the real outage position can be
easily observed if the operator goes to repair the line
at fake outage position. Here, the term “next to” means
that real and fake outage lines have the same end bus.
The mathematical expression can be expressed as
L ∩M 6= φ; (8)
3) the generator output cannot be modified;
4) the line injecting power to no-load bus cannot be se-
lected because the load occurring in no load buses can
be immediately detected by control center;
5) the load of the buses in the attack region cannot be
modified to be negative. Moreover, the difference of the
states and measurements before and after the attack must
be controlled within a specified range; and
6) if the system is separated into two parts when a line is
being attacked, then this line cannot be selected.
B. Real Outage Position Selection for the Physical Attack
When choosing the real outage line, we intend to know the
system operation after the outage of a specific line; however,
the attacker cannot run the power flow for the whole system.
Therefore, instead of running optimal power flow problem, we
employ the LODFs matrix, L ∈ Rnbr×nbr , whose definition
and calculation can be found in [29]. Specifically, we use
the LODF matrix from the DC model to obtain approximate
information of a target line if it has been disconnected, because
the characteristic of the transmission system is sometimes
close to the assumptions of the DC model. The entry in the
m-th row and n-th column of L, lm,n, represents the fraction
of the power flow of the n-th line that will be shifted to the
m-th line when the n-th line faces an outage. By using the
LODF matrix, we can define an influence factor, f , whose l-th
element can be represented as follows:
fl =
((
L{:,l}
)T
sign (<(s))
)
Pl, (9)
where L{:,l} denotes the l-th column taken from L, and
sign (<(s)) denotes the sign of real power. The parameter fl
represents that the amount of the power flow increment for
the whole system if the l-th line is disconnected. In this case,
we can determine the real outage line as follows:
lo = argmax
l
{fl| l = 1, . . . , nbr} . (10)
The lo is the selected real outage position. Then, the buses
connected by lo are assigned to set L.
C. Fake Outage Position Selection and Cyber Attack Region
After presenting the selection of the real outage position, we
then illustrate the method of choosing the fake outage position
without considering the selection of real outage position. More
clearly, in the part, we assume all the lines remain closed in
the system, such that we can ignore the influence from the real
outage event. The idea behind misleading the control center
is to let the control center find a fake outage event in the
system instead of a real one, thereby hindering the control
center from detecting the real outage event and even prompting
it to make a wrong operation or decision. The system faces
more risk as the control center spends more time in locating
the real outage line. Moreover, when dispatching the power
flows, the control center will avoid assigning the flow to the
fake-outage position. Then, based on this response, the attacker
can attempt to create an initial failure. In the power system,
if the power flows are over the thermal limit, meaning the
lines are overloaded, this can cause a failure in the power
system. To this end, after the fake outage position is selected,
the control center can be misled, and redispatched flow over
the residual lines, where the residual lines may end up reaching
their thermal limit, and leading to more outage event. In this
context, the optimization problem of selecting the fake outage
line is expressed as follows:
F2 : max
wl,∀l=1,··· ,nbr
∑
l∈E
P l
Pmaxl
(11a)
s.t. wl ∈ {0, 1}, (11b)
nbr∑
l=1
wl = 1, (11c)
p = p +
(
wTp
) · (Lw). (11d)
Eq. (11a) is the objective function that adds the fraction of the
real power after certain line has no flow, P l, to its thermal
limit, Pmaxl , for all lines. Constraints (11b) and (11c) are the
equations related to the selection vector, w = [w1 · · ·wnbr ] ∈
Rnbr×1. Eq. (11d) calculates the real power after certain line
has no flow, p, based on the LODF matrix. Therefore, the fake
outage position is determined as lm = { l | wl 6= 0, ∀l =
1, . . . , nbr}. The buses linked by the fake outage line, lm,
5are assigned to set M. Appendix A shows the proof of the
selecting criteria.
After the method of selecting the target line is presented,
we discuss the method to determine the cyber attack region,
based on the limitation that the attackers can only alter the
measurement of some selected sensors but not all sensors in
the system. Therefore, we assume that the attacks only have
a limited capability to observe and alter a sub-network of
G. To launch an attack, the attacker maliciously changes the
measurements in a sub-network of G denoted as G = {N , E}.
The buses and lines in the attack region are assigned to set
N and E , respectively. We further separate set N into sets A
and B. The boundary buses in G are assigned to set B, when
the others are assigned to set A.
The key idea of finding the attack region is that we have
to find a new path to re-dispatch the flow, to supply the load
of the buses in M, and to obtain a favorable estimate for the
power flow of lo and the states of the buses in L. The sub-
network can be obtained using the breadth-first search (BFS)
algorithm, which will be discussed later in this paper.
D. Measurements Modification
For the measurement modification, we formulate an opti-
mization problem and meanwhile the physical laws have to be
considered as mentioned in the Section II-A. To follow these
rules, we add the power flow calculation to the constraints.
However, the voltage square in (1) makes the equation become
difficult to solve. The voltage magnitude constraints from
the original power flow model also faces the same issue.
To overcome these issues, we use the DistFlow model [30],
[31], a convex relaxation technique from the original power
flow, to reformulate the AC power flow equations. In this
model, we include two auxiliary variables, namely W =
[W1 · · ·Wnb ] ∈ Rnb×1 and C = [C1 · · ·Cnbr ] ∈ Rnbr×1,
which denote the squared magnitude of bus voltages and line
currents, respectively. The equation in (1) can then be rewritten
as follows:
|Sl|2 = WjCl. (12)
Given that the formulation in (12) is still not convex, we apply
the following convex relaxation:
|Sl|2 ≤WjCl, (13)
where (13) is a widely supported second-order cone constraint.
The relation of W, C, and s can be denoted as
Wj −Wk = (Z∗l Sl + ZlS∗l )− |Zl|2Cl, (14)
where Zl is the impedance of line l that connects buses j and
k. The transmission loss of line l can then be calculated as
ZlCl.
With the power flow model, we then formulate the objective
function as minimizing the required attacker ability, that is,
we minimize the difference in the measurement before and
after the attack. These measurements may include the voltage
magnitudes, voltage phases, loads of buses, and power flows
of the lines. However, the power flows of the lines are closely
related to the voltage magnitudes, voltage phases, and loads
of buses. Therefore, the objective function can be defined as
follows:
J = ‖s− s‖2, (15)
where s is the modified power flow in the attack region.
According to the discussions above, the optimization can
be formulated with J as the objective function. Then, power
flow equations and altered range of the measurements are
regarded as the constraints. The optimization formulation is
then formulated as
F3 : min
W,P
D
,Q
D
,s
J (16a)
s.t.
Wj = |vj |2, ∀j ∈ B, (16b)
V 2min ≤Wj ≤ V 2max, ∀j ∈ A, (16c)
Wj−Wk= (Z∗l Sl+ZlS
∗
l )−|Zl|2Cl,∀j, k∈ N , l∈ E ,(16d)
(1− τ)PDj < P
D
j < (1 + τ)P
D
j , ∀j ∈ N , (16e)
P
D
j + iQ
D
j =
∑
l
(
Sl + ZlCl
)
, ∀j ∈ A, l ∈ E , (16f)
− Pmaxl < P l < Pmaxl , ∀l ∈ E , (16g)∣∣Sl∣∣2 ≤WjCl, ∀j ∈ N , l ∈ E . (16h)
Eq. (16b) shows that the voltage magnitude of the boundary
buses must remain the same, and Eq. (16c) shows that the
voltage magnitudes in A must be controlled within a specified
range. Vmax and Vmin represent the upper and lower bound of
the voltage magnitude, respectively. Eq. (16d) shows relation
of W, C, and the modified apparent power at the “from”
end of line l, Sl, that connects buses j and k. Eq. (16e)
shows that the real load of bus j inside the region before,
PDj , and after modification, P
D
j , must be maintained within a
specified range. Moreover, τ indicates the modification range.
The power injected into the bus must meet the load listed
in Eq. (16f) and Q
D
j is the reactive load of bus j. Eq. (16g)
shows that the modified flows of the l-th line, P l, must be
managed under the thermal limits. Eq. (16h) calculates the
apparent power flow in the attack region.
If the attacker wishes to implement the attack using DC
model, then the optimization problem can be easily formu-
lated. The DC model assumes that if all voltage magnitudes
are set to 1, then no transmission loss takes place, and the
phase difference can be neglected. Based on this assumption,
the formulation is explained in detail in [32].
IV. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY
In this section, we explain the implementation strategy of
the proposed attack scheme by gathering the attack compo-
nents presented in Section III. This strategy is divided into
three phases including total 8 steps as shown in Fig. 2. Step 1
is the first phase which is used to find the real outage position.
Then, the second phase is from Step 2 to 5 containing the
fake outage position selection and attack region determination.
In the final, the third phase focuses on the measurement
modification listed in Step 6 to 8.
In the first phase, we use Eq. (10) to determine the real
outage position. The procedure is outlined as follows:
6First Phase (Section III B)
Second Phase (Section III C)
Third Phase (Section III D)
Select the real 
outage position
Step 1
Select the fake 
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attack region
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modification
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Fig. 2. The implementation strategy of the proposed attack.
Step 1: We select the line whose disconnection generates the
greatest influence on the system. Therefore, lo is selected as
the description in (10), and the buses linked by lo are assigned
to L. We then use LODF to calculate the power flow after l0
faces an outage.
With the real outage position obtained in Step 1, we then
use Problem F2 to select the corresponding fake outage
position. After determining the target lines, we must check if
the selection fulfills the rules described in Section III-A. We
then detailly describe the steps of deciding the attack region.
The region of sub-network G is obtained by using the BFS
algorithm to find the shortest path for redispatching the power
flow. The procedure is outlined as follows:
Step 2: We apply the fake outage position selection algo-
rithm listed in Algorithm 1 to select the fake outage position.
We construct vector u at the beginning of the algorithm, and
then assign each element of u with the objective function
of Problem F2 on the basis of the results of the exhaustive
search. Line l0 must avoid being selected, when line lm obtains
the largest value of the objective function.
Step 3: After selecting the target lines, we must check if
these lines are reasonable or follow the rules described in
Section III-A. If these lines are not reasonable or do not follow
such rules, we then eliminate the unreasonable line lo from f
or lm from u, and then start again from Step 1. Otherwise,
we proceed to the Step 4.
Step 4: Assume that lm flows from buses j to k. The trivial
solution is that we only add and subtract the flow amount to
and from buses j and k, respectively. However, this trivial
solution can be easily recognized by the control center. In this
case, we only add the flow amount to the load of bus j and
try to find another path to supply the load at bus k to prevent
the application of a trivial solution.
Step 5: To find a path for supplying bus k, we initially
consider N and E in G as empty sets. Afterward, we use BFS
algorithm described in Algorithm 2 to find the shortest path
for redispatching the flow. The path obtained from Algorithm
2 is regarded as the sub-network G. We add lo to E and the
buses in L to N as the attack region. The sub-network G is
therefore determined.
From step 1 to step 3, the attack strategy involves many
condition checks, and therefore the attackers may spend most
of time on searching the target lines. However, if the attackers
can analyze the power system and find out the lines, which do
not follow the limitation in Section III-A, before launching
Algorithm 1: Fake outage position selection algorithm
Input: Power flow p, LODF matrix L
Output: fake outage position lm
1 u = [u1 · · ·unbr ] ∈ Rnbr×1
2 for l = 1 to nbr do
3 if l = lo then
4 ul = 0
5 else
6 p = p + Pl · L{1:nbr,l}
7 ul =
∑
l∈E\lo
P l
Pmaxl
8 lm = argmax
l
{ul|l = 1, . . . , nbr}
the attacks, the target lines selection can converge more
quickly. Then, with the target lines and the attack region, the
modification is then based on the solution to Problem F3. The
procedure is outlined as follows:
Step 6: After selecting the attack region, we first set the
power flow of the fake outage position to 0. Then, solve the
optimization Problem F3 based on the AC model listed in
(16). However, if the attacker wishes to employ the DC model,
then the formulation in [32] must be solved. This formulation
is a convex optimization problem that can be dealt with using
many existing algorithms and toolboxes.
Step 7: If the problem has no solution, then the current
attack region cannot satisfy the constraints. We then reapply
Algorithm 2, and go back to Step 6. Otherwise, we proceed
to Step 8.
Step 8: We set z = z and replace the power flow mea-
surements of z in G with the s from the solution to Problem
F3.
With the proposed mechanism, the normalized Lagrange
multiplier of fake outage position will have the largest value
compared to others. In this case, the operator can easily detect
an outage event happening at the fake position. Appendix B
presents the proof of this statement.
V. CASE STUDY
In this section, we adopt the IEEE 14-bus [33], 24-bus [34],
and 118-bus systems [35] to validate our proposed attacking
mechanism. Specifically, we employ the 14-bus test system
to illustrate the proposed method in detail. Fig. 3 shows the
topology of the 14-bus system, when Table I lists the thermal
flow limit of each line. Table I lists the thermal flow limit of
each line in 14-bus system. We then use 118-bus test system to
demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed attack mechanism
in a large system, and the corresponding thermal limits can be
found in [35]. Without any specification, the modification rage,
τ , for all measurements and loads is set to 25%. The voltage
magnitude must be controlled between 1.05 p.u. and 0.95 p.u..
The measurements used for the bad data and parameter error
detection include the real power of all lines at the “from”
end, the voltage magnitude of all buses, and the voltage phase
of the reference bus. The errors for all measurements are
assumed to be ni ∼ N(0, 0.001). The identification threshold
7Algorithm 2: BFS algorithm for finding fake outage
position
Input: System topology G, bus k, sub-network G, line lo
Output: Sub-network G
1 Find a bus g having a generator and is the nearest to bus
k
2 Current system configuration is W = {N , E \ {E , lo}}.
3 g : starting bus. k : destination bus.
4 let the bus g be the progress bus and the level t = 0.
Rest buses are set as unvisited buses.
5 Search all of the unvisited buses connected to the buses
in progress buses. Put such unvisited buses to progress
buses and previous progress buses are assigned as
visited buses.
6 if j ∈ progress bus then
7 go to step 11 of Algorithm 2.
8 else
9 repeat step 5 of Algorithm 2 again.
10 t = t+ 1.
11 Backtrack from the destination bus to the starting bus
level-by-level, and identify the shortest path. The buses
and lines in the path are given to N and E respectively.
n
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Fig. 3. IEEE 14-bus test system [33].
of bad data and parameter error detection is set to 3 which
is outside the 99.80% confidence interval. The blue and red
colors in the simulation results denotes the real and fake
outage positions, respectively. We use the software toolbox
MATPOWER [36] to run the power flow and provide the initial
information of the system. To solve the optimization problem
in (16), we use CVX [37], a package for solving convex
programs. The SE results are obtained through Gauss-Newton
method [26]. Also, all the simulations for computation were
conducted with an Intel i7-6700 computer with 3.4 GHz CPU
and 8GB RAM. The increment ratio of the j-th measurement,
∆j , which denotes the incremental amount compared to the
TABLE I
THE THERMAL FLOW LIMIT AND INFLUENCE FACTOR OF IEEE 14-BUS
SYSTEM
Line number 1 2 3 4 5
Limit (MW) 200 100 100 100 100
fl −28.37 14.60 53.23 4.81 −32.18
Line number 6 7 8 9 10
Limit (MW) 50 100 50 100 100
fl −10.71 −30.43 −4.75 6.86 10.65
Line number 11 12 13 14 15
Limit (MW) 50 20 50 50 50
fl 2.16 −7.33 12.45 NaN -33.05
Line number 16 17 18 19 20
Limit (MW) 20 20 20 20 20
fl −2.62 −0.22 −1.36 −1.36 1.10
10 Line 3 connects two generators 
and line 10 has a transformer
3
211 Bus 1 has no load
13
: Real outage position
: Fake outage position
: Infeasible
 : Infeasible reason
11
17
Line 11 is next to line 13
Fig. 4. Target lines selection procedure of 14-bus system.
original measurement, can be expressed as follows:
∆j =
|z¯j | − |zj |
|zj | × 100%. (17)
A. Implementing the Attack in the 14 Bus System
We select the target lines following Steps 1 to 3 outlined
in Section IV. The influence factors of all the lines are listed
in Table I. Line 3 has the largest value in the influence factor
and the corresponding fake outage position is line 10 based
on the solution of Problem F2. However, line 3 is connected
to two generators and a transformer is located at line 10.
Therefore, these target lines are not feasible, and we have
to find another sets of real and fake outage positions. The
second largest value in Table I is line 2. Line 2 is selected
as real outage position, and line 11 is the corresponding fake
outage position. However, line 2 connects bus 1 and bus 5,
and bus 1 has no load; line 2 cannot be the real outage line.
We then selected the third largest value in Table I. Line 13 is
selected as the real outage position here, and line 11 is still
the corresponding fake outage position. However, line 11 is
next to line 13. We then eliminate line 11 from the possible
solutions, and resolve the Problem F2 again. Following the
proposed recursive way, we eventually select lines 13 and 17
as the real and fake outage lines, respectively. Fig. 4 illustrates
the target line selection process in detail.
Given that the flowing path of the fake outage position is
from buses 9 to 14, we must find a path for supplying the load
8TABLE II
THE SETS USED IN THE MODIFICATION FOR 14-BUS SYSTEM
Set Bus number Description
A 12, 13, 14 The buses in the attack region
B 6 The boundary bus of the attack region
L 6, 13 The buses connecting the real outage line
M 9, 14 The buses connecting the fake outage line
Set Line number Description
E 12, 13, 19, 20 The lines in the attack region
of bus 14. The nearest generator is located at bus 6. Therefore,
we use Algorithm 2 to find the shortest path from the starting
bus, bus 6, to the destination bus, bus 14. Table II summarizes
the attack region based on the results of Algorithm 2. Table III
and IV present the measurements before and after modification
based on the solutions of Problem F3. The computation time
for solving Problem F3 is 0.40 second.
We then perform SE as well as bad data detection by using
these modified measurements. We perform the detection by
calculating the normalized residual and Lagrange multipliers,
and then sort the results shown in Table V(a) in a descending
order. Table V(a) shows two large Lagrange multipliers that
are related to x17 and x20 and are larger than the identification
threshold. We then eliminate those measurements that are
related to x17 and x20 before reapplying bad data detection.
Table V(b) shows the results of the second round of detection.
The largest value in Table V(b) is much lower than the thresh-
old. Therefore, we successfully mislead the control center into
detecting an error on the fake outage position.
B. Consequences of the Attack in the 118 Bus System
Following the same procedure, we apply the proposed attack
mechanism to the 118-bus test system. We then select lines 4
and 21 as the positions of the real and fake outage events,
respectively. The attack region contains 16 buses and 19
lines. We also employ the modified measurements for the
bad data and parameter error detection, which results are
summarized in Table VI. In the simulation, the computation
time for solving Problem F3 is 0.80 second. For the first
round detection presented in Table VI(a), the operator easily
observes that line 21 has an obvious error. After eliminating
the measurements related to line 21, Table VI(b) shows no
error in the measurements. Therefore, in the large system, the
operator can also be misled into detecting a fake outage event.
C. Observability and Effect of Target Lines Selection
The bad data and parameter error detection can be influ-
enced by noise. We collect the results of 1, 000 Monte Carlo
simulations and study the influence of target line selection.
Specifically, we examine the following cases:
• Cases 1, 3, and 5 : Select target lines based on the
proposed method in the 14-bus, 24-bus, and 118-bus
systems, respectively; and
• Cases 2, 4, and 6 : Randomly select target lines in the
14-bus, 24-bus, and 118-bus systems, respectively.
Correct rate
Successful rate
Incorrect rate
False alarm rate
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0%
Fig. 5. Correct and successful rate for different cases.
For the 24-bus system, τ is set to 60% because each line has a
very huge power flow. Therefore, the measurements in a local
area with a small τ cannot be easily modified. If the loads
vary over a certain range, it cannot pass the sanity check from
the control center even the results cannot be detected by the
bad data detection. This setting just helps us demonstrate the
proposed attack strategy in 24-bus system.
If the Lagrange multiplier of the fake outage position has the
largest value among others, then this parameter is regarded as
a correct attack. Meanwhile, if the corresponding Lagrange
multiplier is larger than the threshold, then the attack is
regarded as a successful attack. By contrast, an incorrect attack
is defined as the other Lagrange multiplier or measurement
residual of the line, which is not fake outage position, obtains
the largest value. A false alarm is defined when the largest
Lagrange multiplier or measurement residual of the line, which
is not the fake outage position, is larger than the threshold.
Table VII shows the selected target lines for the six cases.
Fig. 5 and Table VII present the results.
Based on the simulation results presented in Fig. 5, our
proposed selection framework allows a fake outage event
to occur every time for the 14-bus, 24-bus, and 118-bus
systems. However, we cannot guarantee the performance of
our framework if the target lines are randomly selected. The
random selection method also leads to a high false alarm rate
for the system. For Case 2, the fake outage position can be
captured by the operator. However, the corresponding normal-
ized Lagrange multipliers are all lower than the threshold as
shown in Table VII, thereby leading to a 0% success rate. In
the 24-bus system, an unexpected fake outage event is revealed
to the operator for Case 4. Therefore, if the target lines are
randomly selected, then the unpredictable events are revealed
to the operator. In this case, the results cannot be controlled.
For Case 6, if the estimation results are not influenced by
noise, then line 1 shows the largest normalized parameter error.
However, this error is below the detection threshold. Given
that this normalized Lagrange multiplier can only exceed the
threshold under the influence of noise, and then the noise may
also make the errors of other positions exceed the threshold,
thereby hiding the expected fake outage information from the
operator. Moreover, given that the observed outage position is
9TABLE III
THE VOLTAGE AND LOAD BEFORE AND AFTER ATTACK WITH 14-BUS TEST SYSTEM
Bus number Voltage Magnitude (p.u.) Voltage Phase (Angle) Load (MVA)
Before After Increment Before After Increment Before After Increment
6 1.0500 1.0500 0.00% −0.1499 −0.1499 0.00% 11.20 + 7.50i 8.96 + 7.65i −12.60%
12 1.0350 1.0363 0.13% −0.1648 −0.1656 0.48% 6.10 + 1.60i 4.58 + 0.95i −25.83%
13 1.0304 1.0290 −0.14% −0.1658 −0.1682 1.48% 13.50 + 5.80i 10.13 + 5.66i −21.02%
14 1.0161 1.0042 −1.17% −0.1778 −0.2033 13.78% 14.90 + 5.00i 11.18 + 1.49i −28.24%
TABLE IV
THE POWER FLOW BEFORE AND AFTER ATTACK FOR 14-BUS SYSTEM
Line number Power flow (MVA)
Before After Increment
12 7.58 + 2.58i 7.79 + 2.32i 1.51%
13 16.90 + 7.36i 18.93 + 7.47i 10.40%
17 10.49 + 3.41i 0 −100.00%
19 1.41 + 0.83i 2.85 + 0.62i 78.26%
20 4.60 + 1.98i 11.39 + 1.92i 130.64%
TABLE V
THE DETECTION RESULTS FOR 14-BUS SYSTEM
(a) First Round (b) Second Round
Parameter
λNj , r
N
j
Parameter
λNj , r
N
jMeasurement Measurement
x17, x20 3.4160 x12, x13, x19 0.8050
x13 3.1934 x7 0.0430
x11, x16, x18 2.6841 x5 0.0340
x12, x19 0.4600 r12, r13, r19, r33 0.0255
TABLE VI
THE DETECTION RESULTS FOR 118-BUS SYSTEM
(a) First Round (b) Second Round
Parameter
λNj , r
N
j
Parameter
λNj , r
N
jMeasurement Measurement
x21 10.9228 x8, x37 2.2111
x23, x24 7.4409 x20, x22 2.2018
x26 7.0079 x96 1.9532
x36 6.0390 x30 1.8193
TABLE VII
THE PARAMETER SETTING AND THE AVERAGE NORMALIZED LAGRANGE
MULTIPLIER OF CORRECT ATTACK FOR SIX CASES
lo lm
∣∣N ∣∣ ∣∣E∣∣ Average λNlm
Case 1 13 17 4 4 3.4159
Case 2 13 19 3 2 0.1412
Case 3 21 23 10 14 24.9058
Case 4 21 20 9 11 0
Case 5 4 21 16 19 10.8885
Case 6 4 2 5 4 3.2296
TABLE VIII
THE POWER FLOW MODIFICATION FOR 14-BUS SYSTEM
Line number Transmission loss (MVA)
Calculated Real
12 0.3584 + 0.7460i 0.0736 + 0.1531i
13 0.2484 + 0.4892i 0.2484 + 0.4892i
19 0.0175 + 0.0159i 0.0118 + 0.0107i
20 0.2154 + 0.4386i 0.2154 + 0.4386i
not fixed, the operator can easily notice that the system has
been injected with false data by the attacker.
D. Comparison of the AC and DC models
In Seciton V-C, the attacks designed by AC model can
cause very high impact on the system operation. By contrast,
according to [22], the attacks constructed by DC model can
cause high residual in AC state estimation, such that the
attacks can be easily observed. This is because only voltage
phases, real powers, and loads are modifiable in the DC model;
however, AC state estimation further needs voltage magnitudes
and reactive powers. Also, the transmission loss has to be
considered in the AC state estimation, such that the power
flows at the “from” and “to” ends are different. This approach
cannot be obtained with DC model.
Given that transmission loss is considered in the formula-
tion, we then use 14-bus system as an example to explain
the rationale behind our use of the AC model. Table VIII
summarizes the transmission losses in the attack region. The
calculated losses are based on ZlCl as shown in (16f), and
the real losses are taken from MATPOWER according to the
modified voltage and current system topology. Based on the
results, the real and calculated transmission losses of lines 13
and 20 are the same, while those of lines 12 and 19 are slightly
different. These results can be attributed to (13) where the
second-order cone programming relaxation is applied, and to
the fact that the conditions of the boundary buses are bounded
in (16b). Therefore, the
∣∣Sl∣∣2 of some lines are not equal to
WjCl, and hence making the calculated losses larger than the
real losses. However, these differences are smaller than the
power flow. To measure the influence of miscalculated loss
on the dispatch in the attack region, we utilize the following
parameter:
Oinf =
1∣∣E∣∣ ∑
l∈|E|
<(Losscall − Lossreall )
<(s) (18)
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where Oinf is the influence factor, Losscall is the calculated
loss, and Lossreall is the real loss of line l. Then, the influence
factors for the 14-bus, 24-bus, and 118-bus systems are 0.95%,
2.32%, and 1.71%, respectively. The comparison results show
that the error of the calculation is very small compared to the
line flow. Therefore, the influence is limited, and the calculated
error can be regarded as noise when the measurements are
entered into the detection mechanism.
In this work, we aim to create an initial failure through the
proposed method, and then induce the cascade failure to the
power system. From Section V-A to V-C, we have already
demonstrated that the fake outage line can be continuously
appeared as an outage event, and then mislead the control
center. With this approach, an initial failure can be created.
Then, the cascade failure can be propagated from the initial
failure as described in [38]. One more thing that we can
discuss is the impact after the attack such as economic impact.
Although the impacts due to cascading failure or blackout are
the main purpose of the proposed attack strategy, these impacts
are hard to be quantized and evaluated. Therefore, we just
discuss the economic impact in terms of the operation cost in
Appendix C.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a joint line-removing and line-
maintaining attack strategy based on the AC model in which
the attacker maliciously injects false data in the cyber layer to
cover a physical event in the power system. The target of the
attack strategy is to create an initial failure and then induce
the cascade failure in the system. When launching the attack,
the target lines are identified based on the LODF matrix. The
attack region is obtained through the method developed by the
BFS algorithm, and then we modify the measurements from
the power flow equations. The simulation results reveal that
our proposed scheme successfully misleads the control center
and masks the line-outage event.
The potential countermeasures can be separated into two
parts. One possible method is to use historical data to predict
the future income. Then, if the future states have huge differ-
ence compared to predicted states, it can be assumed that there
is an attack event in the system. Another method is to study
the statistical characteristic of the states in the system. More
specifically, the statistical characteristic of data generated by
the attack is different from previous time slots; therefore, the
method such as change point detection can be applied.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Selection Criteria in Section III-B
The formulation in (6) can be rewritten as follows using the
Lagrange method :
min
v̂,Pe
rTR−1r + λTPe (19)
The first-order necessary condition of optimality must satisfy
the following:
∂rTR−1r + λTPe
∂Pe
= HpR
−1r + λ = 0, (20)
where Hp is the Jacobian matrix of the measurement func-
tions, h (Pe,G, v̂), with respect to the network parameter error
vector, Pe. When SE converges, the Lagrange multiplier vector
λ must be expressed as follows:
λ = −HpR−1r. (21)
For the system, R is determined, so λ is related to Hp and
r. The Hp is related to the topology and system states, and
r is caused by the estimation results. Therefore, the residual
vector, r, has an important influence on the results of bad data
and parameter error detection. When selecting the target lines,
if the outage event of one line has a greater influence on the
system compared with the outage event of other lines, then
the residual can be increased. For this purpose, we apply the
LODF matrix to determine the impact when the specific line
is disconnected.
B. Proof of the Efficiency of the Proposed Attack
According to [24]–[26], the normalized a-th measurement
residual and the corresponding Lagrange multipliers for the
l-th line can be represented as
∣∣λNl ∣∣ =
∣∣∣Λ{l,l}Pe{l} +HTp{:,l}R−1{a,a}S{:,a}na∣∣∣√
Λ{l,l}
, (22a)
∣∣rNa ∣∣ = ∣∣S{a,a}na + S{a,:}Hp{:,l}Pe{l}∣∣√S{a,a}R{a,a} , (22b)
where Λ{l,l} denotes the l-th column and l-th row of the
parameter covariance matrix, Λ, S{a,a} is the a-th column
and a-th row of the parameter sensitivity matrix, S, R{a,a} is
the a-th column and a-th row of the noise covariance matrix,
R, Hp{:,l} represents the l-th column of Hp, na is the noise
interference of a-th measurement, and Pe{l} is the parameter
error of the l-th line.
In this section, we explain how the fake outage position
obtains the largest value of the normalized Lagrange multi-
plier compared with the other lines. The influence of noise
is ignored in the derivation. If the m-th line is the fake
outage position and has an erroneous parameter, which means
Pe{m} 6= 0, Pe{l} = 0(l 6= m), then all measurements are
correct. Based on (22a), we obtain∣∣λNm∣∣ = √Λ{m,m} ∣∣Pe,{m}∣∣ , (23a)∣∣λNl ∣∣ = Λ{m,l}√Λ{l,l} ∣∣Pe,{m}∣∣ . (23b)
The ratio of
∣∣λNl ∣∣ to ∣∣λNm∣∣ can be represented as follows:∣∣∣∣λNlλNm
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣Λ{m,l}∣∣√
Λ{l,l}Λ{m,m}
. (24)
To show that
∣∣λNm∣∣ is larger than the other normalized Lagrange
multipliers, we must prove that the ratio in (24) is lower than
1. Consider an expectation of a square value that must be
positive as
E
{
[(λl − E (λl))− (λm − E (λm))]2
}
≥ 0. (25)
From the definition of the covariance matrix, we obtain
Λ{m,m} = E
{
[λm − E(λm)]2
}
, (26a)
Λ{l,l} = E
{
[λl − E(λl)]2
}
, (26b)
Λ{m,l} = E
{
[λm − E(λm)] [λl − E(λl)]
}
. (26c)
Eq. (25) can then be rewritten as follows:
Λ{l,l} − 2Λ{m,l} + Λ{m,m} ≥ 0. (27)
To obtain (25), the determinant of (27) must remain non-
positive as follows:(
2Λ{m,l}
)2 − 4Λ{l,l}Λ{m,m} ≤ 0, (28)
which yields
Λ2{m,l}
Λ{l,l}Λ{m,m}
≤ 1. (29)
After taking the square root for both sides, we obtain
∣∣λNm∣∣ ≥∣∣λNl ∣∣ according to (24). Therefore, the normalized Lagrange
multiplier of the fake outage position obtains the largest value.
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C. Economic Impact of the Attacks
In this section, we discuss the economic impact of the
proposed attack strategy. However, some impacts, such as the
failures in the system or detecting the failures in the system,
cannot be easily quantified as a number. To cope with this
situation, we only discuss the cost that we can calculate, and
therefore we only compare the operation cost. The operation
cost considers the scenario that only the true outage position is
disconnected in the system. Specifically, this is the minimum
operation cost that the control center can obtain after observing
the fake outage event. By contrast, this is also the operation
cost that the attackers can at least cause to the system.
The operation cost increases from 8297.73$ to 8331.50$,
which raises 33.77$, in 14-bus system. In 118-bus system,
the cost increases from 129660.70$ to 129726.25$, which
raises 65.55$. According to the simulation, the operation cost
increases after the attacks. Moreover, if the control center
decides to redispatch the flows, the cost can go even higher,
and then the failures will happen.
The simulations results reveal that the operation cost slightly
increases. This is because we only consider the situation that a
true outage line is disconnected and the control center ignores
the fake outage event. On the other hand, operational costs
for the grid to diagnose the outage event and the delay in
recovering the system are not included in the comparison; all
these damage created to the system is something hard for us
to compute. If we wish to create more economic impact to
the system, there are two directions to further interfere the
operation of the power grid. First, we can attempt to attack
several pairs of target lines, which means several real and fake
outage positions, in the system. More specifically, we can have
several attackers in the system, and they attempt to jointly
attack the power grid. By contrast, we can propose another
attack strategy, which mainly focuses on the impact to the
operation cost, so that the operation cost can be higher than
the results. The abovementioned points can be also regarded
as our future research topics.
